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A B S T R A C T
Previous studies empirically support the existence of a distinctive association between deontological (but not
altruistic) guilt and both disgust and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Given that the neural substrate
underlying deontological guilt comprises brain regions strictly implicated in the emotion of disgust (i.e. the
insula), the present study aimed to test the hypothesis that indirect stimulation of the insula via transcranial
direct current stimulation (tDCS) would enhance disgust and morality in the deontological domain. A rando-
mized, sham-controlled, within-subject design was used. Thirty-seven healthy individuals (25 women) under-
went 15-min anodal and sham tDCS over T3 in two different days, while their heart rate (HR) was recorded to
derive measures of parasympathetic nervous system activity (HR variability; HRV). After the first 10-min of
sham or active tDCS stimulation, participants were asked to 1) complete a series of 6-item words that could be
completed with either a disgust-related word (cleaning/dirtiness) or neutral alternatives; 2) rate how much a
series of vignettes, each depicting a behavior that violated a specific moral foundation, were morally wrong.
Levels of trait anxiety, depression, disgust sensitivity, scrupulosity, and altruism as well as pre- and post- sti-
mulation momentary emotional states were assessed. Compared to the sham condition, after active stimulation
of T3 a) HRV significantly increased and participants b) completed more words in terms of cleaning/dirtiness
and c) reported greater subjective levels of disgust, all suggesting the elicitation of the emotion of disgust.
Although the results are only marginally significant, they point to the absence of difference between the two
experimental conditions for moral vignettes in the altruistic domain (i.e., animal care, emotional and physical
human care), but not in the deontological domain (i.e., authority, fairness, liberty, and sacrality), where vign-
ettes were judged as more morally wrong in the active compared to the sham condition. Moreover, scores on the
OCI-R correlated with how much vignettes were evaluated as morally wrong in the deontological domain only.
Results preliminarily support the association between disgust and morality in the deontological domain, with
important implications for OC disorder (OCD). Future studies should explore the possibility of decreasing both
disgust and morality in patients with OCD by the use of non-invasive brain stimulation techniques.
1. Introduction
In all religions, sin dirties the conscience and washing the body
cleanses the conscience. Empirical studies support the idea that the
association between morality and disgust goes beyond mere metaphor
(Lee and Schwarz, 2011; Schnall et al., 2008a, 2008b). In Zhong and
Liljenquist's seminal study, the recall of unethical acts induced the need
to cleanse oneself (the so called “Lady Macbeth effect”, as demonstrated
“through an increased mental accessibility of cleansing-related con-
cepts, a greater desire for cleansing products, and a greater likelihood of
taking antiseptic wipes” (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006, p. 1451)).
Moreover, physical cleansing helps reducing threats to one's moral self-
image (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006).
Physical and moral disgust share some features such as the fear of
contamination. Mental contamination occurs in the absence of direct
contact with a contaminant, and is seen for example when victims of
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immoral acts, such as rape, develop strong feelings of contamination,
and associated compulsive washing (Herba and Rachman, 2007;
Rachman, 2004). Mental contamination is a characteristic of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD), it can be worsened by the addition of
elements of betrayal (Rachman et al., 2012), and seems to have a moral
quality that, in our view, is deontological in nature. In OCD, disgust
serves to protect oneself from mental contamination, in the sense of
safeguarding the self from deontological degradation.
The Lady Macbeth effect has not always been replicated (Earp et al.,
2014). In our view, such inconsistencies may be due to the fact that
studies usually ask participants to recall an ethical or unethical deed,
without considering an important distinction within the domain of
guilt; i.e. the distinction between altruistic and deontological guilt
(Mancini and Gangemi, 2017). The first appears when one appraises
one's own conduct as not being altruistic (e.g., not having shared a
victim's destiny such as in survivor guilt, or not having been close to
her/him under difficult circumstances like a health disease), and the
second arises out of the assumption of having violated one's own moral
rules. In altruistic guilt, there is always a victim, but there may not have
been any violation of moral rules. In deontological guilt, on the con-
trary, there may be no victim (e.g., incest between consenting siblings),
or one could feel deontological guilt even when acting for the good of a
victim as in the case of euthanasia, where -to reduce the victim's suf-
fering- the moral norm of “Not Play God” has to be violated. Thus in
deontological guilt, the assumption of having violated a moral rule is
necessary and sufficient.
In the last decade, empirical evidence supporting the distinction
between the two types of guilt has been accumulated. For example, the
work of D’Olimpio and Mancini (2014) showed that the induction of
deontological guilt triggered more obsessive compulsive-like washing
behaviors compared to the induction of altruistic guilt. This effect was
replicated and extended by Ottaviani et al. (2018), who also found that
compared to altruistic guilt, inducing deontological guilt enhanced
vagally-mediated heart rate variability (HRV). HRV is a proxy for
parasympathetic activation (Rohrmann and Hopp, 2008), and has been
used as a useful indicator to examine the relative contribution of disgust
and fear (Cisler et al., 2009; Davey, 2011). In fact, the topography of
autonomic nervous system response is distinct for general stress/fear
and disgust. The former being characterized by phasic HRV suppres-
sion, representing the withdrawal of cardiac vagal control and the ac-
tivation of the defensive systems (e.g., Park et al., 2014), and the latter
being characterized by HRV increases, due to baroreceptor activation
and parasympathetic dominance (Ekman et al., 1983; Schlegel et al.,
2001). During disgust, HRV increases mainly because disgust-related
functions such as monitoring of tastes, rejection of inedible foods,
nausea and vomiting are achieved by activation of the vagus nerve
parasympathetic drive to the heart via brainstem nuclei (Babic and
Browning, 2014).
Importantly, a neuroimaging study by Basile et al. (2011) found that
the induction of deontological guilt increased activation of brain areas
implicated in the emotion of disgust, such as the insula (Pujol et al.,
2018), whereas altruistic guilt elicited activation in the theory of mind
network, particularly in medial prefrontal brain areas. Taken together,
these studies suggest that the Lady Macbeth effect may be more strictly
connected with deontological rather than altruistic guilt. Indeed, in the
two emblematic cases of Pontius Pilatus and the baptism, the act of
washing is related to deontological guilt.
Other studies based on the affect theory, demonstrated that the
severity of moral judgment can be amplified by disgust (amplification
hypothesis). For instance, Tobia (2015) reported that the sensation of
dirtiness elicits a stronger tendency to judge oneself more negatively
from a moral point of view. Similarly, Rozin and colleagues (Rozin
et al., 1999) found that people tend to associate disgust with purity
violations that have greater conceptual relation to deontological rather
than altruistic guilt. A meta-analysis of studies in which incidental
disgust was manipulated prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment
task, found only a small effect size, which disappeared after controlling
for publication bias (Landy and Goodwin, 2015). Unexpectedly, the
authors found that the amplification effect is not restricted to moral
transgressions in the purity domain. This result could be considered
contrary the hypothesis of a distinctive bidirectional effect between
disgust and the deontological domain. However, in our view some of
the studies described in the meta-analytic work by Landy and Goodwin
(2015) used paradigms that do not take into account the altruistic op-
tion but instead oppose deontological and consequentialist choices (i.e.,
producing more overall good than any alternative action). Moreover,
the deontological choice is often spurious and confounded with al-
truistic motivations, like in the so-called “footbridge dilemma.” In this
dilemma, you can save five people from a runaway trolley by pushing a
fat man off the bridge, on to the track below. This scenario does not
distinguish between altruistic and deontological guilt, because one can
opt for the deontological choice of omission for two different motiva-
tions: the so-called “Do not play God” (deontological motivation), or
because of empathic feelings toward the fat man (altruistic motivation).
Indeed, as suggested by authors of the meta-analysis, it is necessary to
develop procedures that induce core disgust in ways that do not
transgress social norms, as some of these inductions actually imply
moral disapproval or small harm to participants (Landy and Goodwin,
2015).
The current study aims to provide further insight into the re-
lationship between morality and disgust. Our overall hypothesis is that
deontological -but not altruistic- morality is distinctively associated
with the emotion of disgust, and this may, at least partially, explain
existing contradictory findings on the Lady Macbeth effect.
Drawing on preexisting neuroimaging evidence on the association
between deontological guilt and brain regions associated with disgust
(e.g., the insula), we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)
to indirectly stimulate the insula. A series of previous studies show that
with this methodology it is possible to stimulate the areas located just
below the temporal cortex, comprising the insula by the use of tDCS
over T3 (Montenegro et al., 2011; Okano et al., 2015; Petrocchi et al.,
2017; Piccirillo et al., 2016). If deontological -but not altruistic- guilt is
strictly connected with the emotion of disgust, and they share part of
the same neural network, i.e. the insula, then our prediction would be
that anodal stimulation over T3 (versus sham) elicits the emotion of
disgust in non-pathological individuals via indirect stimulation of the
insula. To obtain a comprehensive assessment of disgust, we combined
three different types of measures: subjective self-report, physiological,
and implicit measures. This is in line with the suggestion of Landy and
Goodwin (2015), because the definition of core disgust does not imply
the violation of social norms, and it offers different measures of the
construct of disgust.
The use of implicit measures is based on the recognition that emo-
tional cognitive processes can occur implicitly (Winkielman and
Berridge, 2004). The implicit measure used in the present study is the
word fragment completion task, which assesses the extent to which
affective information is accessible from memory (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2003; Denny and Hunt, 1992).
Our second predicted result is that anodal stimulation over T3
(versus sham) would enhance moral judgment in the deontological but
not in the altruistic domain. To assess moral judgment in these two
domains, we used the Moral Foundations Vignettes developed by
Clifford et al. (2015), which are based on the domains of the Moral
Foundation Theory, an influential scientific account of morality de-
signed to explain the variety and universality of moral judgments
(Graham et al., 2011). The theory incorporates psychological, devel-
opmental, and evolutionary perspectives and proposes that morality is
built upon five innate "foundations," each of which selected during
human evolution and, subsequently, tuned-up by learning during de-
velopment (see the Moral Task section for a detailed description of the
domains).
It is known that the association between morality (and particularly
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deontological morality) and disgust is enhanced in OCD. In particular,
Reuven et al. (2014) found a higher Lady Macbeth effect in patients
with OCD compared to healthy controls, showing that a higher sensi-
tivity to guilt accounts for washing symptoms in these patients. More-
over, Kang et al. (2016) examined which of the domains represented in
Moral Foundations Theory clustered most strongly with obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and found that purity/sanctity is the most re-
levant moral domain. Several studies using fMRI suggest that tasks
aimed at eliciting OC symptoms in these patients activate the same
areas that are involved when non-pathological individuals are experi-
encing deontological guilt, in particular, the anterior cingulate cortex
and the insulae (Basile et al., 2011; Mataix-Cols et al., 2005; Rauch
et al., 1998). Lastly, results from Ottaviani et al. (2013) suggest that
immorality relies on the same biological root of physical disgust only in
subjects with obsessive-compulsive tendencies. Given these premises,
our last hypothesized result is that the increase in levels of disgust and
deontological morality after stimulation of the insular region would be
stronger in participants with higher obsessive-compulsive dispositional
tendencies.
2. Methods and materials
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from public advertisements in social
networks; the final sample was mostly composed by graduate and
postgraduate students of several universities in Rome.
Forty-one individuals agreed to participate in the study and com-
pleted a pre-screening online questionnaires. Exclusionary criteria
were: age younger than 20 years and self-reported prior history of head
injury, major medical neurological or psychiatric disorder, cognitive
impairment, history of substance or alcohol abuse or dependence, di-
agnosis of heart disease, and pregnancy.
After excluding 4 participants because 3 of them reported a psy-
chiatric diagnosis, and one decided to drop out from the study after the
first session of stimulation, the final sample was composed of 37
healthy individuals (25 women), mean age = 26.78 (5.04) years. All
the participants were Caucasian. All the subjects provided written in-
formed consent and the study has been carried out in accordance with
the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of
Helsinki) for experiments involving humans. The study was approved
by the Bioethical Committee of S. Lucia Foundation, Rome, Italy.
Participants were compensated for their time (30 Euros).
2.2. Procedure
Participants were screened by a series of online questionnaires.
Eligible participants were asked to avoid drinking coffee and smoking
cigarettes for at least 2 h prior to the sessions. A randomized, sham-
controlled, within-subjects design was used. Each participant under-
went anodal and sham tDCS on two different days with a minimum
interval between sessions (48 h). During the entire experimental pro-
tocol, participants sat in front of a 15-in. color monitor, at a distance of
about 60 cm. First, the HR device was attached using a standard elec-
trode configuration; HR was recorded throughout the entire protocol.
Then, participants underwent a 3-min Vanilla baseline assessment
during which they were asked to read a neutral magazine (Jennings
et al., 1992). At baseline and at the end of the experimental protocol,
participants rated their momentary affect on a series of 5-point Likert
scales. Participants then underwent a 15-min tDCS sham or active sti-
mulation during which they were asked to rest for the first 10min, and
to complete two subsequent computerized tasks (i.e., moral task and
word-stem completion task) for the remaining time (5min).
2.3. tDCS
An anodal or sham tDCS was applied in a counterbalanced random
order over T3 (2mA during 15min), using the BrainSTIM device (EMS
s.r.l., Italy). A cathodal tDCS condition was not included for the reason
that, whereas it is well established that anodal tDCS increases cortical
excitability, the effects of cathodal tDCS are still a matter of debate
(Monte-Silva et al., 2010).
The electric current was applied using a pair of sponges soaked in
saline solution. The anodal and cathodal electrodes (35 cm2) were
connected to a constant current stimulation device with three power
batteries (9 V) presenting a maximal output of 10mA. For the anodic
stimulation targeting left insular cortex, the anode was placed over T3
area according to the international EEG 10–20 system. The cathode was
placed over the supraorbital contralateral area (Fp2) and fixed by
elastic bands. The electrodes were placed in the same position of the
anodal stimulation to perform the sham condition; however, the sti-
mulator was turned off after 30 s. Thus, the subjects reported to feel a
tingling or itching sensation coming from the initial electrical stimu-
lation, but they did not receive any further current. This procedure
allowed the subjects to remain “blind” in respect to the type of polarity
stimulation received during the test and to assure a sham control effect
(Gandiga et al., 2006).
2.4. Computerized tasks
2.4.1. Moral task
E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools) was used for
stimulus presentation and response collection. After the first 10-min of
stimulation, sentences that described immoral situations were pre-
sented in random order on the computer screen. The vignettes used in
the present study were adapted from a previously validated large set of
moral foundations vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015). These foundations
concern dislike for the suffering of others (care/harm), proportional
fairness (fairness/cheating), group loyalty (loyalty/betrayal), deference
to authority and tradition (authority/subversion), concerns with purity
and contamination (sanctity/degradation), and concerns about dom-
ination and coercion (liberty/oppression) (Haidt, 2013; Iyer et al.,
2012).
The adaptation consisted of two steps: 1) We have decided to ex-
clude the loyalty domain due to the strong cultural dissimilarity be-
tween the US and Italy with regard to this concept; 2) We have replaced
sacrality items because they were all related to the body, thus leading a
bias toward disgust. Sacrality items were created ad-hoc based on the
seven deadly sins (e.g., greed, lust).
Sixty-two participants took part in a preliminary study conducted to
validate the set in an Italian sample. A link to an online questionnaire
was sent via institutional mailing lists and social media. Following the
methodology of Clifford et al. (2015), participants were asked to
evaluate how much they judged each of the 92 vignettes as morally
wrong on a Likert scale from 1= not at all to 5= very much.
Following this procedure, the 42 vignettes that received the highest
scores were selected, 21 of them presented during each tDCS session.
Within each group of 21 vignettes, there were 3 vignettes for each
specific moral foundation that had been violated: physical animal care
(n= 3; e.g., “You see a boy setting a series of traps to kill stray cats in
his neighborhood”), emotional care (n= 3; e.g., “You see a man
snickering as he passes by a cancer patient with a bald head”), physical
human care (n= 3; e.g., “You see a girl throwing her hot coffee on a
woman who is dating her ex-boyfriend”), authority (n=3; e.g., “You
see a girl ignoring her father's orders by taking the car after her
curfew”), fairness (n=3; e.g., “You see a politician using federal tax
dollars to build an extension on his home”), liberty (n=3; e.g., “You
see a man blocking his wife from leaving home or interacting with
others”), and sacrality (n= 3; “You see a homosexual in a gay bar of-
fering sex to anyone who buys him a drink”). The first three categories
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(animal, emotional, and physical human care) are attributable to the
altruistic domain; whereas authority, fairness, liberty and sacrality
belong to the deontological domain. Each vignette depicts a behavior
violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes
presented in the two experimental conditions (active vs sham tDCS)
were matched within-domain based on the score that they obtained
during the preliminary study (e.g., a vignette belonging to the authority
domain in the active tDCS condition was matched with a vignette be-
longing to the same domain and having received the same average
score). The vignettes were also controlled on many dimensions in-
cluding syntactic structure and complexity.
After the first 10 min of tDCS stimulation (active or sham), the
following instructions appeared on the screen: “Please rate how much,
in your opinion, each of the following behaviors is morally wrong. To
answer, please press the number on the computer keyboard that cor-
responds to the level of immorality from 1=not at all to 5= very
much”. Each sentence appeared in the top of the computer screen fol-
lowed by the rating scale to remind the possible answers, and they
remained visible until a response was given.
The score in each category (e.g., physical human care) was com-
puted as the sum of the scores obtained on three items belonging to that
specific category (ranging from 3 to 15). Then, given that the altruistic
domain was composed of three categories, whereas the deontological
domain was composed of four categories, the total score for "how much
is it morally wrong" for each of these two domains was calculated as the
average of the scores obtained in the categories belonging to that do-
main (e.g. for the altruistic domain: sum of the scores obtained on
animal care, emotional care, and physical human care divided by 3; the
total score ranges from 3 to 15 for each domain).
2.4.2. Word-fragment completion task
Participants were next asked to complete a 6-item word completion
task during which an incomplete word appeared in the center of screen
and remained visible until a response was given. This task has been
used in previous studies on mental accessibility (e.g., Schimel et al.,
2003; Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006).
For each of the 6 words, presented in random order, respondents
had to write 3 letters in the consecutive white spaces. Each word could
be completed with either a disgust-related word (cleaning/dirtiness) or
at least a non-disgust alternative. Examples of stimuli are: S - - - NE
(sapone: soap OR salone: salon); DO - - -A (doccia: shower OR doppia:
double). Six different words were randomly selected for each session
from a total number of 12 words. To avoid conscious deliberation that
might contaminate the implicit processing style of the measure, the test
instructions encourage respondents to answer each item as quickly as
they can and skip any that do not readily come to mind. To account for
potential contamination due to cognitive ability, the ratio of target
words the participants endorses as disgust-related to that of the total




Participants completed a set of questionnaires accessing socio-de-
mographic (age and level of education) and lifestyle (nicotine, alcohol,
caffeine consumption, medication, and physical activity) information as
well as psychological trait and symptoms (e.g., anxiety, disgust sensi-
tivity), and their momentary emotional state.
The trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI;
Spielberger et al., 1970; Italian translation by Pedrabissi and Santinello,
1989) is a 20-item scale that evaluates relatively stable aspects of
“anxiety proneness”, including general states of calmness, confidence,
and security (e.g., “I am a steady person”). Cronbach's alpha in the
present study was 0.92.
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D,
Radloff, 1977; Italian validation by Fava, 1983) is a 20-item self-report
scale that assesses the frequency of occurrence of symptoms of de-
pression during the previous week (e.g., “I felt that everything I did was
an effort”). Total score ranges from 0 to 60. Standard cut-offs are 16 for
mild depression and 23 for clinical depression. Cronbach's alpha in the
present study was 0.73.
To assess the disgust sensitivity and the obsessive compulsive ten-
dencies, the following tests were used: The Obsessive–Compulsive
Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) as a measure of the pre-
sence and severity of obsessions and compulsions, consists of 18 items
rated on a 5-point scale (0= not at all to 4= very much) according to
the degree of disturbance caused by a behavior (e.g., “I check things
more often than necessary”). Cronbach's alpha in the present study was
0.85.
The Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; Olatunji et al., 2007a, 2007b), as a
measure of individual differences in sensitivity to disgust, is a 27-items
scale composed by two parts: DS-R(a) consists in 14 items rated on a 5-
point scale (0= totally disagree to 4= totally agree) according to the
degree of agreement to a sentence (e.g., “I never let any part of my body
touch the toilet seat in public restrooms”) and DS-R(b) consist in 13
items rated on a 5-point scale (0= not at all disgusting to 4= ex-
tremely disgusting) according to the degree of repugnance caused by a
situation (e.g., “While you are walking through a tunnel under a rail-
road track, you smell urine”). Cronbach's alpha in the present study was
0.81.
The Pennsylvania Inventory of Scrupulosity-Revised (PIOS-R;
Olatunji et al., 2007a, 2007b) is a 15 item self-report questionnaire
designed to assess the degree of scrupulosity-related symptomatology
on a 5-point scale (0= never to 4= constantly) according to the fre-
quency of subjective experiences (e.g., “I worry that I might have dis-
honest thoughts”). Cronbach's alpha in the present study was 0.92.
The Self-Report Altruism Scale (SRAS; Rushton et al., 1981) is a 20-
item self-report scale asking to rate the frequency with which one has
engaged in a series of altruistic behaviors (e.g., “I have donated blood”)
on a 5-point scale (0= never to 4= very often). Cronbach's alpha in
the present study was 0.85.
The MFQ is designed to assess individual moral system on five moral
foundations: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal,
Authority/Subversion, and Purity/Degradation (Graham et al., 2011).
This questionnaire is composed of 2 parts: The first part asks partici-
pants to rate, on a 6-point scale, the relevance of various considerations
to whether an act is right or wrong (e.g. “Whether someone suffered
emotionally”). The second part asks participants to rate, on a 6-point
scale, their agreement to various statements (e.g. “Chastity is an im-
portant and valuable virtue”). Each part is comprised of 16 items, 3
items corresponding to each of the foundations, and 1 catch item.
Cronbach's alpha in the present study was 0.92.
2.5.2. Affect rating
At the beginning and at the end of the experimental protocol, par-
ticipants were asked to rate their current levels of happiness, shame,
fear, sadness, disgust, anger, pity, altruistic guilt, and deontological
guilt on a 5-point Likert scale from 1= not at all to 5= very much
(adapted from D’Olimpio and Mancini, 2014). Given the within-subject
design and therefore the need to perform the two tDCS sessions in
different days, a change score was computed for each session sub-
tracting the baseline for that specific session from the affect rating after
stimulation or sham tDCS (e.g., Δhappinessstim = happinesspost-stim –
baseline happinessbaseline stim). Positive scores reflect higher levels of the
perceived emotional state from baseline to post-tDCS.
2.6. Physiological data
HR was recorded as beat-to-beat intervals in ms with the Bodyguard
2 (Firstbeat) device. HRV was assessed by computing the root mean
square of successive beat-to-beat interval differences (RMSSD), which
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reflects vagal regulation of HR (Task Force of the European Society of
Cardiology, 1996). Outlier and artifact detection, as well as HRV ana-
lyses were performed using Kubios HRV software (Tarvainen et al.,
2014). From now on, we will use HRV to refer to RMSSD. Given the
within-subject design and therefore the need to perform the two tDCS
sessions in different days, a change score was computed for each session
subtracting the baseline for that specific session from the HRV values
during stimulation or sham tDCS (e.g., ΔHRVstim = HRVduring stim -
HRVbaseline stim). Positive scores reflect and increase in HRV from
baseline to post-tDCS.
2.7. Data analysis
The analyses were carried out using SPSS Version 21. Differences at
p≤ .05 are regarded as significant. Data were first checked for outliers,
normality of variables, and for violations of statistical assumptions of
General Linear Models (GLMs).
First, given that sex differences have been previously acknowledged
in moral judgments (e.g., Fumagalli et al., 2010), heart rate variability
(Koenig and Thayer, 2016), and neural responses to disgust (Caseras
et al., 2007), differences between men and women in the main variables
of the study were examined by t-test.
Second, to examine the effect of active vs sham tDCS on the elici-
tation of disgust, a series of univariate analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA) with stimulation type as within-subject factor and DS-R
score as covariate were performed on the following variables:
a) the ratio of disgust-related words over total recognized words to test
for the accessibility of disgust-related information from memory
(implicit measure of disgust);
b) Δ affect rating for each of the examined items (explicit measure of
disgust);
c) Δ HRV (physiological measure of disgust).
To study whether active tDCS enhances moral judgment in the
deontological but not in the altruistic domain, we have first obtained
two scores based on 1) the average of scores attributed to altruistic
vignettes (i.e., animal, emotional, and physical human care), and 2) the
average of scores attributed to vignettes in the moral domain (i.e.,
authority, fairness, liberty, and sacrality). Then, a 2×2 repeated
measures ANCOVA was performed with stimulation type (active vs
sham tDCS) and moral domain (altruistic vs deontological) as within-
subject factors and DS-R score as covariate.
Lastly, to investigate whether increased levels of disgust and
deontological morality after stimulation of the insular region would be
stronger in participants with higher obsessive-compulsive dispositional
tendencies, Pearson correlations were performed between scores on the
OCI-R, SRAS, MFQ, PIOS-R, and DS-R and ΔHRVstim, Δdisguststim, ratio
of disgust-related words over total recognized words, and moral judg-
ment to the deontological and altruistic vignettes.
3. Results
No adverse effects occurred, with the exception of commonly re-
ported side effects as tingling and itching. Sham and active tDCS
blinding guessing was beyond chance.
Table 1 shows sex differences for the main variables of the study.
Women were characterized by higher levels of depressive symptoms (t
(35)= 2.13, p= .04) and disgust sensitivity (t(35)= 2.86, p= .007)
compared to men. No other sex differences emerged.
Table 2 illustrates the effect of active vs sham tDCS on the elicitation
of disgust. When controlling for disgust sensitivity (DS-R scores), during
active (compared to sham) tDCS participants reported higher subjective
levels of disgust (F(1,35) = 4.99, p= .03; ηp2 = 0.12) and completed
more words in terms of cleaning/dirtiness (F(1,35) = 26.88,
p < .0001; ηp2 = 0.43), suggesting the elicitation of the emotion of
disgust. Similarly, greater pre- to post-stimulation HRV was observed
during the active tDCS condition compared to sham (F(1,26) = 4.50,
p= .04; ηp2 = 0.15), consistently with the elicitation of disgust at a
physiological level. Table 2 also shows a significant effect of active vs
sham tDCS on pity (F(1,35) = 5.80, p= .02; ηp2 = 0.14), with in-
creases in self-reported levels of pity after active tDCS.
Analysis on the moral vignettes yielded a main effect of type of
vignette (deontological vs altruistic), with altruistic vignettes rated as
more morally wrong irrespective of stimulation (F(1,36) = 4.67,
p= .04, ηp2 = 0.12). A marginally significant effect of stimulation type
x vignette type also emerged (F(1,36) = 3.51, p= .06, ηp2 = 0.10). The
covariate (DS-R score) did not play a significant role in the model (F
(1,35) = .02; p= .88; ηp2 = 0.001).
As depicted in Fig. 1, the type of stimulation only had an effect on
deontological vignettes, which were judged as more morally wrong
during active (11.55 ± 1.21) compared to sham stimulation
(11.22 ± 1.37), with a small-to-medium effect size (Cohen's d = 0.26
for post-hoc comparison). No difference emerged for altruistic vignettes
(11.73 ± 1.54 vs 11.83 ± 1.74 during active and sham tDCS, re-
spectively).
Notably, Δ disguststim was significantly correlated with both Δ
HRVstim (r=0.55; p= .001) and the word ratio (r=0.41; p= .01),
somehow supporting the reliability of our implicit, physiological, and
Table 1
Gender differences (means ± standard errors) in socio-demographic, disposi-
tional, and physiological variables.
Women (n = 25) Men (n = 12) t/χ2
Age (years) 27.2 ± 1.01 26 ± 1.47 0.65
Education 4 C; 18 G; 3 P 6C; 5 G; 1 P 4.77
Exercise (h/w) 1.8 ± 0.53 1.3 ± 0.77 0.59
CES-D 21.5 ± 1.33 16.5 ± 1.92 2.13*
STAI-t 43.9 ± 2.04 40.9 ± 2.95 0.85
DS-R 55.9 ± 2.32 44.3 ± 3.35 2.86*
PIOS-R 14.5 ± 2.55 12.5 ± 3.53 0.51
SRAS 29 ± 2.05 30.5 ± 2.96 0.42
OCI-R 25.6 ± 2.31 19.1 ± 3.34 1.62
HR (bpm) 76 ± 2.11 80.9 ± 2.78 1.39
HRV (ms) 34.7 ± 2.41 35.1 ± 3.51 0.09
Note: C, College; G, Graduate; P, Postgraduate; h/w= hours per week; CES-D=
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; STAI-t= State Trait Anxiety
Inventory, Trait form; DS-R = Disgust Scale-Revised; PIOS-R = Penn Inventory
of Scrupulosity-Revised; SRAS = Self-Report Altruism Scale; OCI-R =
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised. HR = Heart Rate (Averaged baseline
scores); HRV = Heart Rate Variability (Averaged baseline scores); *p < .05.
Table 2
Mean scores (± standard errors) for active tDCS stimulation (vs sham) on self-
reported (Δ=post-tDCS momentary affect minus baseline momentary affect),
physiological (Δ=HRV during tDCS minus HRV at baseline), and implicit
measures (Δ=ratio of disgust-related words to the total of recognized words).
Stim (n = 37) Sham (n = 37) F(df)
Δ Shame 0.19 ± 0.12 0.08 ± 0.08 0.67 (1,35)
Δ Sad 0.00 ± 0.11 −0.16 ± 0.09 2.70 (1,35)
Δ Fear −0.13 ± 0.12 −0.35 ± 0.12 2.11 (1,35)
Δ Disgust 0.05 ± 0.08 −0.08 ± 0.09 4.99* (1,35)
Δ Anger 0.00 ± 0.12 −0.19 ± 0.11 1.50 (1,35)
Δ Pity 0.13 ± 0.11 −0.16 ± 0.11 5.80* (1,35)
Δ Altruistic guilt −0.14 ± 0.11 −0.19 ± 0.10 0.12 (1,35)
Δ Deontological guilt −0.08 ± 0.08 0.03 ± 0.06 2.87 (1,35)
Δ Happy −0.11 ± 0.09 −0.22 ± 0.11 0.58 (1,35)
Δ HR −0.03 ± 0.56 0.73 ± 0.68 0.62 (1,28)
Δ HRV 4.56 ± 1.39 −0.89 ± 1.91 4.50* (1,26)
Δ Words 0.38 ± 0.04 0.17 ± 0.02 26.88** (1,35)
Note: HR = Heart Rate; HRV = Heart Rate Variability.
* p < .05.
** p < .0001.
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subjective measures of disgust. Moreover, scores on the PIOS were
significantly correlated with both Δ disguststim (r=0.53; p= .001) and
Δ HRVstim, (r=0.60; p= .001). A significant association also emerged
between scores on the SRAS and moral judgment to the altruistic
vignettes only (r=0.41; p= .01). On the other hand, moral judgment
to the deontological vignettes was associated with scores on the OCI-R
(r=0.33; p= .05) and particularly with the washing subscale of the
OCI-R (r=0.37; p= .03).
4. Discussion
The broad aim of the present study was to further explore the ex-
istence of a unique association between deontological morality and
disgust. Capitalizing on preexisting evidence on the association be-
tween deontological guilt and activation of the insula (Basile et al.,
2011), we hypothesized that non-invasive stimulation of the insular
cortex by tDCS would enhance: 1) subjective, implicit, and physiolo-
gical levels of disgust; 2) moral judgment in the deontological but not in
the altruistic domain.
As expected, tDCS stimulation over T3 elicited disgust as indicated
by our implicit and physiological measures, and by self-reports.
Importantly, these measures were significantly inter-correlated. Such
association is not unanticipated, as Mossink et al. (2015) also found an
association between implicit measure of affect and cortisol.
The present study also replicated results from previous studies
conducted in favor of the notion that electrical stimulation applied over
the temporal lobe (T3) can reach surrounding deep cerebral areas like
the insula (Lang et al., 2005), with significant effects on para-
sympathetic modulation of HR (Montenegro et al., 2011; Okano et al.,
2015; Petrocchi et al., 2017; Piccirillo et al., 2016). However, none of
these previously conducted studies interpreted the increase in HRV that
followed tDCS stimulation as due to the elicitation of the emotion of
disgust. This is somewhat surprising, given the recognized role of this
brain area in disgust sensitivity (Lane et al., 1997; Phillips et al., 1997).
Our implicit measure (i.e., the word-fragment completion task), as well
as physiological and subjective measures, all point to increased levels of
disgust after active tDCS stimulation, suggesting that this specific
emotion may indeed be the trigger for the increased HRV, following
tDCS stimulation over T3.
Following the suggestion of Landy and Goodwin (2015) we used an
induction that does not imply the transgression of a moral norm (i.e.,
participants voluntarily consented to participate to a tDCS study and
the sham condition was identical to the stimulation condition). Results
are not conclusive but support a relationship between disgust and
morality, particularly in the deontological domain. The present study
does not aim to unmask the type of association between these two
constructs (amplification or elicitation hypotheses), as it only showed
that tDCS over T3 simultaneously enhances disgust and the severity of
moral judgments in the deontological domain. In our view, the indirect
stimulation of the insular area in healthy participants increases the
association between disgust and deontological morality and this models
a distinctive feature of OCD (e.g., Basile et al., 2014; Mancini and
Gangemi, 2015).
In line with the above assumption, the fact that participants gen-
erally rated the vignettes as more morally wrong in the altruistic do-
main may be due to the fact that the sample was not composed of in-
dividuals with OCD, who would be more sensitive to deontological
morality (e.g., Basile et al., 2014; Mancini and Gangemi, 2015). Indeed,
a positive correlation emerged between scores on the OCI-R and moral
judgment in the deontological domain. On the other hand, scores on the
SRAS were associated with moral judgment only in the altruistic do-
main, supporting the existence of two forms of morality and the method
used to categorize the vignettes.
The interaction between stimulation type and vignette type was
only marginally significant (p= .06), however, the effects were in the
expected direction, suggesting that the active stimulation of the insula
enhanced morality only in the deontological domain. Cannon et al.
(2011) also supported this notion using facial muscle activity, showing
that facial disgust was highest in response to purity violations; fur-
thermore, subsequent moral judgments about purity and fairness (but
not harm violations) were predicted by facial disgust.
The role of the temporal cortex, and particularly the insular region,
in moral judgment has been recognized in a review on the functional
and clinical neuroanatomy of morality (Fumagalli and Priori, 2012).
The present study is not the first to highlight a specific involvement of
the insula in moral processing and norm violations implicated in
deontological judgment (see Huebner et al., 2009). Of note are the
scores on the VAS, for which we found only a weak effect of active tDCS
on disgust and also on pity. Moreover, we did not find the expected
effect of active tDCS on deontological guilt, which would have been in
line with our hypothesis. Whereas disgust is a primary emotion, pity
and deontological guilt are secondary emotions. As such, they are more
strongly affected by the way in which individuals interpret the specific
situation that they are experiencing. In the present study, we have re-
assessed participants’ momentary affect at the end of the protocol, i.e.
after the moral task. It is likely that reading a series of moral scenarios
influences participants’ interpretation of their current emotional state.
Further studies need to evaluate how tDCS stimulation over T3 speci-
fically and differentially affects primary and secondary emotions.
A major limitation of the current study is that topographical spe-
cificity of the tDCS effect has not been demonstrated (i.e., by stimu-
lating a control site of the brain), thus allowing for the possibility that
the observed findings are non-specific. Second, it would have been of
major interest to also include anodal tDCS of the right temporal cortex,
given that also the right insula forms a core of the central autonomic
network (Beissner et al., 2013 for a meta-analysis). Third, although we
have used a standardized set of the vignettes and we did our best to
adapt them to the Italian culture by running a preliminary study, our
categorization of the moral foundations in altruistic and deontological
morality might be questionable. Lastly, despite our effort to recruit
among the general population via the use of social networks and ad-
vertisements, the majority of the sample consisted of graduate and
postgraduate students, which may hinder the generalization of the re-
sults.
In the case of successful replication, the present study has important
clinical implications, considering that both deontological morality and
Fig. 1. Effects of active versus sham tDCS on moral judgment in the deonto-
logical and in the altruistic domains. Note. The total score for "how much is it
morally wrong" in each domain (i.e., altruistic and deontological) represents the
sum of the scores obtained on each category belonging to that domain, divided
by the number of categories belonging to that domain, i.e. the average (e.g., for
the altruistic domain: sum of the scores obtained on animal care, emotional
care, and physical human care divided by 3; the total score ranges from 3 to 15
for each domain).
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disgust play a central role in OCD (Mancini, 2016; Power and Dalgleish,
2008). Here, we have used tDCS to increase cortical excitability in the
insular region, but it is known that cathodal tDCS has the potential to
decrease excitability (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000), although the cano-
nical assumption “anodal excitation, cathodal inhibition” has not al-
ways been replicated” (AeCi-effect; Jacobson et al., 2012). Thus, there
is the need to replicate and extend present findings in non-pathological
individuals with the inclusion of a cathodal condition in the experi-
mental design. In the case of successful replication, the next step would
be to run a randomized controlled trial on OCD patients to test whether
these effects are applicable to the clinical setting. It is important to note
that Basile et al. (2014) found that -when faced with stimuli evoking
deontological guilt- patients with OCD showed decreased activation in
the insula compared to controls. The authors interpret these data as
suggesting that this pattern may reflect patients’ cerebral efficiency,
due to the frequent exposure to deontological feelings (neural efficiency
hypothesis; Del Percio et al., 2009). Thus, further investigation of the
brain correlates of deontological morality in OCD is needed before non-
invasive brain stimulation techniques can be used as therapeutic means.
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